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I.

INTRODUCTION

While the medical community struggles to develop a cure for the disease
known as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS),' lawyers around the
country are trying to cope with the many legal issues raised by the AIDS
epidemic. The AIDS crisis has spawned increased public hysteria and fear about

AIDS victims and the means by which AIDS carriers transmit the disease. 2
These fears are evident in employment discrimination against AIDS victims or
persons perceived as having AIDS. 3 To understand the legal implications of the
AIDS epidemic, lawyers must first develop a basic knowledge of the AIDS
virus.
AIDS is a disease characterized by the breakdown of the body's immune

1.

See Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome -

United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY

WEEKLY REP. (Centers for Disease Control) 17 (1986) [hereinafter Update]. Medical experts first
recognized AIDS as a separate disease in 1981. Since then, over 16,000 people have contracted
some form of the disease. Id.
2. See Flaherty, A Legal Emergency Brewing Over AIDS, Nat'l L.J., July 9, 1984, at 1, 44,
45, col. 4 (California lawyer is suing the City of Los Angeles, claiming that city paramedics, wrongly

thinking he had AIDS, were reluctant to help him when he suffered a heart attack); Freedman,
Wrong Without Remedy, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 36, 40 (Florida judge required that AIDS victims

wear masks in his court).
3. See generally Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 681 (1985) (general overview of AIDS virus, statutory protection for AIDS victims, and
employer defenses to discrimination claims).
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system. Researchers believe it is caused by a virus known as HTLV-III/LAV.4
The AIDS virus renders the body's immune system incapable of fighting off
certain fatal diseases.' So far there is no cure. 6 AIDS strikes most frequently
among certain high-risk groups, such as male homosexuals, intravenous drug
users, recipients of blood transfusions, and hemophiliacs.7 The medical community has a limited understanding of the disease at this time; however, the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC)" and others have established several known
methods by which humans transmit AIDS.9 Specifically, humans transmit AIDS
through bodily fluids in sexual contact, blood transfusions, exposure between
infected mothers and children at childbirth, and shared needle use by intravenous drug abusers.' 0 Although researchers have located the AIDS virus in
saliva, there currently is no medical evidence of transmission through casual
contact with or proximity to infected persons." Researchers at the CDC con4. Update, supra note 1, at 19-21; see also NIH Conference - The Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome: An Update, 102 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 800 (1985) [hereinafter NIH Conference]. Researchers are confident that HTLV-III/LAV causes AIDS and AIDS-related complex because of
its "almost absolute association with these diseases despite its relatively rare occurrences in nature
and its in-vitro biologic effect on immune cells." Id. at 806.
5. NIH Conference; supra note 4, at 809. The suppression of the immune system exposes
patients to various "opportunistic" infections and malignant conditions that generally do not afflict

similarly situated individuals without AIDS. These conditions include Kaposi's sarcoma, a form of
skin cancer, and pneomocystis carinii pneumonia, a severe lung disease. Id. at 802-05.
6. Council of Scientific Affairs, The Acquired Immunodefiiency Syndrome, 252 J. A.M.A. 2037,
2041 (1984) ("At present, there are no cases of AIDS in which the immune system has been
reported to have recovered. Thus far, most patients with AIDS have eventually succumbed .... ");
see also Levy, Bredesen & Rosenblum, Neurological Manifestations of the Acquired Immunodficieny
Syndrome (AIDS): Experience of UCSF and Review of Literature, 62 J.NEUROSuRGERY 475, 478 (1985)
(80% of AIDS victims die within two years of diagnosis, and within three years the mortality rate
is almost 100%); NIH Conference, supra note 4, at 802 ("No patient who has unequivocal acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome has yet been cured of this invariably fatal disease.").
7. Update, supra note 1, at 18. Among adult patients, 94% belong to groups that suggest

a possible means of disease acquisition: men with homosexual or bisexual orientation with histories
of intravenous drug use (8% of cases); homosexual or bisexual men who are not known intravenous
drug users (65%); heterosexual intravenous drug users (17%); persons with hemophilia (1%);
heterosexual sex partners of persons with AIDS or at risk for AIDS (1%); and recipients of
transfused blood or blood components (2%). The remaining patients have not been classified by
recognized risk factors for AIDS. Id. Difficulties in data collection probably account for most of
the unclassified (6%). Id. at 18-19.
8. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare established the CDC on July 1, 1973,
as a health agency within the Public Health Service. Among other functions, the CDC administers
programs for communicable disease prevention and control, directs and enforces foreign quarantine
activities, and participates with national and international agencies in the eradication or control of
communicable diseases. See PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS & LEGISLATIVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1985-86 at 276 (1985).
9. Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Mayers & Klein, Lack of Transmission of HTLVIII/LA V Infection to Household Contacts of Patients With AIDS or AIDS-related Complex With Oral Candidiacis,
314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 344, 346 (1986) [hereinafter Friedland, Saltzman].
10. Summaiy: Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection With Human T-Ljmphotropic
Virus Type lll/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. (Centers for Disease Control) 681-82 (1985) [hereinafter Workplace Recommendations].
11. Id. at 682. "HTLV-III/LAV has been isolated from blood, semen, saliva, tears, breast
milk, and urine and is likely to be isolated from some other body fluids, secretions, and excretions,
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cluded in November 1985 that "[t]he kind of nonsexual person-to-person contact
that generally occurs among workers and clients or consumers in the workplace
12
does not pose a risk for transmission of HTLV-III/LAV.
Despite this medical data, intense press coverage of the AIDS epidemic has
resulted in widespread public hysteria, including unreasonable fears about the
virus' transmissibility. 13 Consequently, AIDS victims and others in high-risk
groups are encountering employment discrimination due to employers' fears of
exposing co-workers to the virus.14 While countless legal questions continue to
develop, this note is confined to the issue of AIDS-related employment discrimination. 5
AIDS-related employment claims generally allege violations of state 6 or
federal 17 handicap discrimination laws. Complaints alleging federal violations are
brought under section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act ("section 504" or
"the Act"). 8 The outcome of a pending United States Supreme Court case
may decide whether victims of AIDS-related employment discrimination are
protected under the Act.'

9

In Arline v. Nassau County School Board, the Supreme

Court granted certiorari to review an Eleventh Circuit decision.20 The issue
presented is whether the Rehabilitation Act protects a person with infectious
tuberculosis from employment discrimination. 2' Lawyers representing both management and employees agree that the Supreme Court's decision will have far-

but epidemiologic evidence has implicated only blood and semen in transmission." Id. Casual contact
with saliva and tears does not transmit the infection. Id. Neither is the disease transmitted by
contaminated food or water, air-borne or fecal-oral routes. Id. at 683; see Friedland, Saltzman,
sutra note 9, at 348. ("transmission of the infection requires injection of blood or blood products
or intimate sexual contact, and . . . longstanding household exposure to patients with AIDS is
associated with little or no risk of transmission of HTLV-III/LAV infection"); Provisional Public
Hralth Service Inter-Agency Recommendations for Screening Donated Blood and Plasma for Antibody to the Virus
Causin' Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (Centers for
Disease Control) 1 (1985) ("[No] cases have been documented to occur through such common
exposures as sharing meals, sneezing or coughing, or other casual contact."). But see Hunt, Teaming
Up Against AIDS, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1986, (Magazine), at 42. " '[T]he C.D.C. . . . has been
trying to inform the public without overly alarming them ....
But we outside the Government
are freer to speak. The fact is that the dire predictions of those who have cried doom ever since
AIDS appeared haven't been far off the mark.' " Id. (quoting Myron Essex, Chairman of the
Department of Cancer Biology at the Harvard School of Public Health).
12. Workplace Recommendations, supra note 10, at 682.
13. Freedman, supra note 2, at 40.
14. Id. at 38.
15. This note will not address other AIDS-related issues such as AIDS testing, quarantine,
privacy rights or liability associated with blood donations.
16. Florida, for example, enacted the Human Rights Act of 1977 to prohibit discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. FLA. STAT.
§ 760.01-.37 (1985).
17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i) (1982)).
18. Id.
19. Arline v. Nassau County School Bd., 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106
S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
20. 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986).
21. Id.
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reaching implications. 22 The Court's decision may set a precedent that all individuals with any form of contagious disease, including AIDS, are protected
23
from employment discrimination by the Act.

A United States Department of Justice (DOJ) opinion 24 recently considered
AIDS-related employment discrimination. The DOJ opinion, which may influence the Supreme Court's Arline decision, advocated a different conclusion than
the one reached by the Eleventh Circuit. The DOJ concluded that section 504
should not protect individuals suffering discrimination because of their real or
perceived ability to transmit a contagious disease. 2
This note analyzes the DOJ opinion and the Eleventh Circuit's Arline decision, and discusses their potential effects on the pending Supreme Court case
and on AIDS-related litigation. 26 The issue of whether AIDS victims or members
of high-risk groups are "handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act will be
examined. 27 This note also addresses whether AIDS victims can be "otherwise
qualified" for employment in view of the transmissibility of the disease.28 Finally, the note concludes that extending the Act's protection to victims of AIDSrelated employment discrimination will benefit society by furthering the legislative purpose underlying section 504.29
II.

THE REHABILITATION ACT

Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act 0 in 1973 with the purpose of integrating the handicapped into society and giving them greater access to society's
22.
(1986).
23.

24.

AIDS and Employment: News, Warnings, and Guidelines, 22

FAIR EMPL.

PRsc. (BNA) 52

Id.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,

REHABILITATION

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION OF SECTION

ACT TO PERSONS WITH AIDS, AIDS-RLATED COMPLEX,

504

OF THE

OR INFECTION WITH THE

AIDS VIRUS 1 (June 23, 1986) [hereinafter DOJ OPINION]. The Department of Justice coordinates
the implementation and enforcement of 5 504 by executive agencies. See Exec. Order No. 12,250
5 1-201(c), 3 C.F.R. 298 (1981), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 note (1982).
25. DOJ OPINION, supra note 24, at 1, 26, 49; see infra text accompanying notes 132-39.
26. 106 S. Ct. at 1633.
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(A) & (B) (1982); infra text accompanying notes 38-59.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); infra text accompanying notes 60-93.
29. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1986).
30. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits employment discrimination against handicapped
persons. 29 U.S.C. §5 701-796(i) (1986). Section 793 requires most federal contractors to undertake
affirmative action to employ handicapped individuals. Id. 5 793. Section 504 of the Act forbids
employment discrimination against handicapped persons by programs receiving federal financial
assistance. Id. § 794. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that § 504 of the Act applied to all federal financial assistance, not just to federal
assistance specifically aimed at creating jobs. In a contemporaneous, consistent decision, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that receipt of Medicare and Medicaid funds by hospitals subjected
them to the nondiscrimination policies of § 504. United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Center,
736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 958 (1985). Subsequently, airlines using
airports constructed and operated with federal funds have been held subject to the Act. Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act imposes the same nondiscrimination policies on the federal executive branch,
including the postal service. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.
1981).
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benefits.3 1 Section 504 of the Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in any program or activity conducted by federal agencies or receiving
federal financial assistance.3 2 The Act provides that a handicapped individual
cannot be discriminated against under any federally funded program, solely
33
because of his handicap, if the individual is otherwise qualified for the position.
Section 504 has four elements. First, an individual claiming discriminatory
treatment must be a "handicapped individual" as defined by the Act.3 4 Second,
the person must be "otherwise qualified" for the position. 5 Third, the person
must be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise
be discriminated against under a "covered program or activity. ' 36 Finally, the
discrimination must be "solely by reason of . . . [the] handicap. 3 7 Elements
three and four are beyond the scope of this note because a court's interpretation
would not differ between cases involving AIDS victims and other handicapped
individuals.3 8 Conversely, a court's interpretation of "handicapped individual"
and "otherwise qualified" will directly affect whether the Rehabilitation Act
39
prohibits AIDS-related employment discrimination.
A.

Who Is a "Handicapped Individual?"

Section 504 defines "handicapped individual" as any individual who "has
a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such

31. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982). The congressional purpose is "to develop and implement, through
research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated
programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living." Id.; see Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (primary goal of Act was to increase employment of the handicapped);
Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 867, 869 (1984) (goal of Act is integration of all handicapped individuals into normal
community living, working, and service patterns).
32. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1986).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). The statute specifically states, in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section
706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id.
34. See id. § 706(7)(B) (defining handicapped individual); infra text accompanying notes 40-50.
35. The Act does not define the term "otherwise qualified." The accompanying regulations
do, however, define qualified handicapped person as "a handicapped person who, with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1)
(1986).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,
632 (1984) (any federal financial assistance will invoke protections of § 504).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 applies only to discrimination based directly on
handicap. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2114 (1986) ("If, pursuant to
its normal practice, a hospital refused to operate on a black child whose parents had withheld their
consent to treatment, the hospital's refusal would not be based on the race of the child .... ").
38. Satisfying these elements will turn on the type of business or programs, and a factual
inquiry into the basis for the discrimination.
39. Absent statutory language specifically including communicable diseases, AIDS victims must
look to the courts for guidance.
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person's major life activities." ' The Act extends handicapped status to persons
having a record of 4' or those perceived as having such an impairment. 41 Individuals can, therefore, qualify as handicapped under section 504 if they suffer
from a disabling impairment, have recovered from a previous impairment or
were misclassified as having such a condition, 43 or are regarded as having such
a condition."
The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare promulgated regulations in 1977 that further explained the Act's definition of handicapped individual. 4 Examples of major life activities listed in the regulations
include caring for one's self, walking, seeing, breathing, learning, and working."
The Secretary's accompanying analysis also provided a list of covered diseases
and conditions, but stressed that the list was not comprehensive. 47 The Secretary
deliberately chose not to limit impairments to "traditional" handicaps. 48 The
requirement that there be a real or perceived physical or mental impairment,
however, precludes a claim based on environmental, cultural, and economic
40. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(i) (1982).
41. Id. § 706(7)(B)(ii).
42. Id. § 706(7)(B)(iii). This subsection excludes abusers of alcohol or drugs by specifically
providing:
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate to employment,
such term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current
use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would
constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.
Id.
43. 45 C.F.R. 5 84.3j)(2)(iii) (1986). This regulation provides: " 'Has a record of such an
impairment' means has a history of, or has been miscalculated as having, a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." Id.
44. Id. § 84.30)(2)(iv). This section states:
"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical or mental impairment
that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as
constituting such a-limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment;
or (C) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section but is
treated by a recipient as having such an impairment.
Id.
45. Id. § 84.3()(2)(i). This regulation provides:
"Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
Id.
46. Id. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
47. The disease and conditions listed are "orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular distrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, and . . . drug addiction and alcoholism." Id. Pt. 84,
App. A at 310.
48. The regulations state that "[t]he Department continues to believe . . . that it has no
flexibility within the statutory definition to limit the term to persons who have those severe, permanent, or progressive conditions that are most commonly regarded as handicaps." Id.
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disadvantage, prison record, age, or homosexuality. 49 The regulations indicate
that under section 504, the term "handicapped" is defined more broadly than
its common usage might suggest.5 0
In applying section 504, federal courts have also broadly construed the definition of handicapped individual. For example, in Davis v. Bucher,51 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that drug
addicts or persons with a history of drug use were within section 504's protection
as handicapped persons.5 2 The court reasoned that drug addiction substantially
affected an individual's ability to perform major life activities. 53 Similarly, in
Duran v. City of Tampa,5 4 the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida determined that section 504 provided relief to a person excluded from
service as a city police officer solely because of a history of epilepsy. The Duran
court noted that the plaintiff had not experienced seizures in the past sixteen
years. 55 The defendants refused to hire the plaintiff only after learning of his
history of epilepsy. 56 The plaintiff was otherwise qualified and was refused employment based on the defendant's presumption of unfitness.5 7 Both Bucher and
Duran illustrate the broad protection given by federal courts to handicapped
individuals under section 504.
With the exception of the recent Eleventh Circuit decision in Arline, federal
courts have not addressed the issue of section 504 protection for persons with
contagious diseases.58 Consequently, extending the Act's protection to victims
of AIDS-related discrimination claims will require the courts to expand section
504's coverage. Cases decided under the Act, such as Bucher and Duran, and
5 9
regulations accompanying section 504 arguably warrant such an expansion.
B.

Who Is "Otherwise Qualified?"

The second pertinent element of section 504 requires that the handicapped
person be "otherwise qualified" to participate in or receive the benefits of the
49. Id.
50. See DOJ

OPINION,

supra note 24, at 17 n.56.

51. 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
52. Id. at 796-97. The city denied the plaintiffs the benefits of a federally funded program
by excluding them from consideration for city employment. Id. at 794.
53. Id. at 795. The court noted that Congress intended to provide assistance for those who

had overcome their addiction and to support those attempting to overcome addiction. Id. at 796.
54.

430 F. Supp. 75, final order, 451 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1977).

55.

Id. at 76, 78.

56. Id. The plaintiff had satisfactorily completed all of the defendant's examinations, and the
defendant balked at hiring him only when presented with his history of epilepsy. Id.

57. Id.
58. Although federal case law regarding contagious diseases as handicaps is sparse, several
state courts have addressed this issue. See, e.g., People v. 49 West 12 Tenants Corp., No. 83436,704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (AIDS is a disability under New York Human Rights Law); Chrysler

Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1986) (acute lymphotic leukemia qualified as a handicap under the
Wisconsin Fair Employment Act); Shuttleworth v. Broward County, No. 85-0624, slip op. at I
(Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations Apr. 22, 1986) (AIDS qualified as a handicap under Florida
Human Rights Act).

59. See supra note 48.
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covered program or activity. 0 The Secretary's regulations define a "qualified
handicapped person" as one who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the job. 61 While section 504 does not expressly require
"reasonable accommodation,' '62 case law and the Secretary's regulations suggest
that reasonable accommodation is included in the Act's definition of an "other63
wise qualified" handicapped individual.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,64 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the phrase "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" under section 504. In Davis, a severely hearing-impaired woman sought training as a
registered nurse.65 The defendant Southeastern Community College, a state institution receiving federal funds, refused to admit Davis into its nursing program. 66 The college asserted the plaintiff's reliance on lip reading for
communication would result in unsafe conditions for patients involved in the
6 7
clinical aspect of the program.
The Supreme Court held that Davis was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" because she could not meet all of the program's requirements. 68 The Court reasoned that under section 504, mere presence of a handicap
is not a permissible ground for assuming a person is unable to function in a
particular context. 69 The terms of the Act do not, however, suggest that a person
who fails to meet legitimate physical requirements is otherwise qualified for the
job. 70 An otherwise qualified person is "one who is able to meet all of a
71
program's requirements in spite of his handicap.
In dicta, the Court indicated that an individual may be otherwise qualified

60.
61.
62.
63.

See supra note 33.
See supra not 35.
See supra note 33.
See supra note 35; see also Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)

(refusal to accommodate may be discriminatory when no undue burden would be imposed on
employer); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1984) (handicapped student states

§ 504 cause of action by alleging that school district refused to provide reasonable accommodation);
Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316, 321 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982)

(case remanded for factual inquiry into whether accommodations necessary to employ plaintiff as
police officer were unreasonable).

64. 442 U.S. at 398. Justice Powell authored the unanimous opinion. Id. at 399.
65. Id. at 400. The Duke University Medical Center diagnosed the plaintiff as having a
"bilateral sensorineural hearing loss." The plaintiff could not "discriminate among sounds sufficiently to understand normal" speech. Id. at 401.

66. Id. at 400-01.
67. Id. at 401. The lower court noted that in a situation such as an operating room, all
doctors and nurses wear surgical masks, which would prohibit the plaintiff from lipreading. Id. at

403.
68. Id. at 414.
69. Id. at 405.
70. Id. at 406.
71. Id. The Supreme Court cited the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's regulations interpreting § 504, which provide that a qualified handicapped person is "[w]ith respect
to postsecondary and vocational education services, a handicapped person who meets the academic

and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the [school's] education program
or activity." 45 C.F.R. 5 84.3(K)(3) (1985).
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in some instances even though he cannot meet all of a program's requirements. 72
For example, if an employer's refusal to modify an existing program to accommodate the handicapped individual would be unreasonable, the employer's
actions would be discriminatory. 7 The Third Circuit interpreted Davis as requiring the consideration of two factors in determining the reasonableness of
an employer's actions. 74 According to the Davis test: "First, requiring accommodation is unreasonable if it would necessitate modification of the essential
nature of the program . . . . Second, requiring accommodation is unreasonable
if it would place undue burdens, such as extensive costs, on the recipient of
federal funds." 73
Various United States Courts of Appeals have applied the Supreme Court's
two-prong test to determine whether a person is an otherwise qualified handicapped individual under section 504.76 The courts are divided, however, on
the question of how much deference courts should give to program administrators or employers in determining whether applicants or employees are otherwise qualified.17 The Supreme Court did not discuss this aspect of judicial
7
review in its Davis opinion. "
Some courts defer to employers because of the employer's experience with
the particular type of employment.7 9 Other courts suggest that broad judicial
deference undermines Congress' intent in enacting section 504.0 The legislative
history of section 504 shows that Congress intended to prohibit the use of

72. 442 U.S. at 412.
73. Id. at 413.
74. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983).
75. Id. The Davis Court observed that since the plaintiff could not participate in clinical
courses, the defendant could only allow her to take academic classes. The plaintiff would not receive
even a rough equivalent of a normal nursing program. The Court considered this a "fundamental
alteration in the nature of a program." 442 U.S. at 410.
76. See, e.g., Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing
application of Davis test to requirement that DOT make reasonable accommodations for hearingimpaired school bus driver).
77. Some courts grant substantial deference to administrators' judgments, absent proof of
naked discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health - Mental Retardation
Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983) (trial court properly granted judgment to defendant hospital
notwithstanding verdict for mentally handicapped therapist, where administrators determined therapist was not otherwise qualified because of her propensity to convey her suicidal tendencies to
her patients). Other courts required rigorous scrutiny of administrators' decisions. See, e.g., Arline
v. Nassau County School Bd., 772 F.2d at 765 (lower court made no findings on whether the
risks entailed in retaining a teacher with contagious tuberculosis precluded her from being otherwise
qualified); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985) (case remanded for review
of employer's evidence that substantial risk of future harm existed for epileptic postal employee);
Bentivegna v. Department of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982) (employer's decision to
terminate diabetic building repairer because of risk of employee's future injury must be carefully
examined to avoid circumvention of the Rehabilitation Act).
78. 442 U.S. at 397.
79. See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1981) (court deferred to
university's knowledge regarding necessary program requirements).
80. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 405 (Court scrutinized nursing program requirements). See generally
Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: RehabilitatingSection 504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
171 (1980) (legislative history of § 504 discussed).
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stereotypes and generalizations regarding handicapped persons.81 Heightened judicial scrutiny, therefore, is demanded because employers may use stereotypes
to legitimize discrimination, thereby depriving handicapped persons of the pro82
tection Congress intended.
The Third Circuit developed a standard applying the Davis test and effectively reconciled the competing considerations. 83 In Strathie v. Department of Transportation," the Department suspended a hearing-impaired school bus driver because
the driver violated a Department regulation by wearing a hearing aid. The
Department argued that the driver was not "otherwise qualified" in spite of
his impairment because necessary accommodations would present a risk to the
safety of school bus passengers.8" The court stated that a handicapped individual
is not "otherwise qualified" if accommodating the individual would meet either
part of the Davis test.8 6 After reviewing the record, the court determined the
necessary modifications would neither change the essential nature of the Department's regulations, nor impose an undue burden on the Department.87
Therefore, the court remanded the case for further consideration in accordance
with its decision. 8
Whether an AIDS victim or a member of a high-risk group is an "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual" under section 504 will depend on the outcome
of four inquiries. First, can the employee perform the essential job functions
in spite of the handicap? 89 Second, if the handicap impairs job performance,
can the employer make accommodations to facilitate the employee's performance? 90 Third, are the accommodations reasonable, or will they change the
essential nature of the job or place an undue burden on the employer? 9 Finally,
will the court defer to an employer's decision regarding the reasonableness of
accommodations, or will the court strictly review the decision for evidence of
discriminatory intent?" The United States Supreme Court will consider these
issues when reviewing the Eleventh Circuit's Arline decision.9 3 The deference
the court gives to the school board's decisions about the reasonableness of

81. See Note, supra note 80, at 175.
82. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).
83. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
84. 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 233.
86. Id. at 231. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied a similar standard in New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979). See infra text accompanying notes 183-87 (discussion of Carey); ef. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d
228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying factual basis standard in sex discrimination case).
87. 716 F.2d at 234.

88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Davis, 442 U.S. at 407 (nursing student's inability to understand speech without
reliance on lip reading rendered her unable to meet essential program requirements); Duran v.

City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75, 78 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (police officer applicant had satisfactorily
completed all examinations in spite of history of epilepsy).
90. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

91.

Id.

92.

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

93.

772 F.2d at 760.
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accommodating a teacher with tuberculosis will determine the deference given
to employers dealing with AIDS-related claims.
III.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS

A.

The Eleventh Circuit

On April 21, 1986, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Arline v. Nassau County
School Board.94 The school board attorneys petitioned the Court to review the
lower court's decision that tuberculosis is a protected handicap under section
504. 95 Additionally, the Court directed both parties to brief the issue of whether
someone with tuberculosis is precluded from being "otherwise qualified" for
96
the job of elementary school teacher under section 504.
In Arline, the school board fired a Florida elementary school teacher because
of her susceptibility to tuberculosis.97 Although she contracted the disease at an
early age, Arline performed her job competently for thirteen years before suffering three relapses.9 The district court held that a contagious disease such
as tuberculosis is not a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act. 99 Furthermore,
the court concluded that the school board had no obligation to offer Arline
alternative positions because the board had an "overriding duty to protect the
public from contagious diseases.' ' 10
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
and held that persons with contagious diseases are covered by section 504.1,1
The court stated that "a person with tuberculosis is . . . one who 'has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits . . . major life activities' . . .
since the disease can signficantly impair respiratory functions as well as other
major body systems." 1 2 To support its decision, the court observed that neither
the statutory language nor the accompanying regulations indicated that chronic
contagious diseases should be excluded from the definition of handicap. 0 3 On
94. 106 S. Ct. at 1633-34.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1634. Justice Stevens dissented and suggested that the case be remanded to the
district court "for further findings as to whether the risks of infection precluded Mrs. Arline from
being otherwise qualified for her job." Id.
97. 772 F.2d at 760.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 761. The district court gave an oral opinion. Factual references, therefore, are to
the Eleventh Circuit's opinion. Id. The district court supported its decision by stating that Congress
could not have intended to include contagious diseases in § 504's definition of a handicapped
person. Id. at 763.
100. Id. at 761. The district court found that Arline was unqualified to teach outside of
elementary education. The court stated it had no obligation to afford Arline alternative positions.
Id.
101.

Id. at 765.

102. Id. The court observed that even when not directly afflicted by tuberculosis, Arline would
fall within the Act's protection because she had a record of such an impairment, and was regarded
as having such an impairment. Id.; see 45 C.F.R. S 84.3(j)(2)(iii)-(iv) (1985).
103. 772 F.2d at 764; see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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the contrary, the court noted that "Congress' failure to exclude contagious
diseases from coverage, when it specifically excluded alcoholism and drug abuse,
implies that Congress harbored no similar disapproval about them. 01 4 The court
declined to create an exemption without evidence that Congress intended to do
so.' The court reasoned that identifying such an exemption would free employers from any duty to reasonably accommodate persons afflicted with contagious diseases.'°6
Despite the lofty purposes of the Act, the court recognized that not all
handicapped individuals can be integrated into all aspects of society." 7 The
court limited the Act, therefore, "to situations where the handicapped individual
would be otherwise qualified if given reasonable accommodation.' 0 8 The determination of the legitimate physical qualifications essential to performance of
a certain job is a fact-specific issue. 0 9 In this case, the district court failed to
resolve the many factual disputes between Arline and the school board." 0 The
dispute centered around Arline's allegations that her handicap did not impair
her performance because the risk of infecting her students was so minimal."'
Arline alternatively claimed that the school board could make reasonable accommodations by offering her an administrative job or a temporary position
teaching older, less susceptible persons."12 The district court failed to articulate
the school board's reasons for refusing to accommodate Arline." 3 Instead, the
court relied on its decision that the school board had no duty to weigh the
costs versus the risks involved in accommodating Arline because of an overriding
duty to the public to prevent the spread of disease."14
The court of appeals concluded that the school board could not simply claim
an overriding duty to the general public to exempt itself from liability for
arbitrarily depriving qualified handicapped individuals of their jobs."' Instead,
the court stressed that an employer's decision must reflect a well-informed judgment based on an unbiased weighing of risks and alternatives."16 Thus, an
employer cannot use conclusory statements to "justify reflexive reactions grounded
in ignorance or capitulation to public prejudice."" ' 7

104. 772 F.2d at 764; see supra note 42. But see DOJ OPINION, supra note 24, at 44, 47. The
DOJ cautioned against interpreting congressional silence to include communicable diseases under

5 504. Id.
105. 772 F.2d at 764.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Eleventh Circuit cited Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-13. See tent accompanying notes
72-73 for discussion of Davis.
109. 772 F.2d at 764.
110. Id. at 765.
111. Id. at 761.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 765.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d
Cir. 1979) (health hazard of hepatitis transmissibility only remote possibility); Strathie, 716 F.2d at
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Arline could mean that AIDS
is a handicap for purposes of employment discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act." 8 Even if tuberculosis is considered a handicap, however, Arline may not be otherwise qualified under the law because of her ability to
transmit the disease.119 Consequently, the effect on AIDS-related claims depends
on the Court's reasoning as to what, if anything, an employer must do to
reasonably accommodate otherwise qualified individuals with communicable dis-

eases. 12-

B.

The Department of Justice

A Department of Justice opinion released June 23, 1986121 may influence
the Supreme Court's decision in Arline and the future of AIDS-related employment discrimination claims. 22 Although the DOJ opinion addressed AIDSrelated discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 23 the Supreme Court may rely on the opinion because of the similarity between AIDS
124
and tuberculosis as communicable diseases.
25
The DOJ opinion
concluded that section 504 "prohibits discrimination
based on the disabling effects that AIDS and related conditions may have on
their victims."' 26 On the other hand, the opinion concluded that an individual's
real or perceived ability to transmit the disease to others is not a handicap within
the meaning of the statute. 127 Therefore, discrimination based on fear of contagion would not fall within section 504.128
The DOJ had little difficulty determining that persons suffering from the
disabling effects of AIDS would qualify as handicapped under section 504.129
In its opinion, the DOJ noted that the effects of AIDS on its victims constituted
impairments because AIDS is a "physiological disorder or condition" affecting
the "hemic and lymphatic" systems.'2 0 Furthermore, this impairment "substantially limits the major life activity of resisting disabling and ultimately fatal
3
diseases.' '
234 (need factual basis in record to exclude handicapped person without attempting accommodations).

118. If the Court holds that tuberculosis, as a communicable disease, is protected, AIDS would
also be protected.
119. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case on Contagious Disease, Discrimination, I AIDS POL'Y &
(BNA) No. 7, at 1 (Apr. 23, 1986).

LAW

120. Id. at 2.
121. DOJ OPINION, supra note 24, at 1.
122. Justice's AIDS Opinion Scored by American Medical Association, 1 AIDS

POL'Y

&

LAW

(BNA)

No. 13, at 1 (July 16, 1986) [hereinafter AIDS Opinion].
123. DOJ OPINION, supra note 24, at 1.
124. AIDS Opinion, supra note 122, at 1.
125.
126.

DOJ OPINION, supra note 24, at 49.
Id. at 1, 22, 49.

127. Id. at 1.
128.

Id. at 1, 24-29, 49.

129.
130.

Id. at 22.
Id.

131.

Id. The DOJ also noted that AIDS involves the opportunistic disease that may substantially

limit major life activities. Id. at 23.
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The DOJ also determined that the ability to transmit the disease does not
render a person handicapped under section 504.132 Seemingly, the DOJ reached
this conclusion by ignoring established medical opinions and giving credence,
instead, to employers' irrational fears of AIDS transmission in the workplace. 13
The DOJ reasoned that an immune carrier of the AIDS virus, or an uninfected
member of a high-risk group, is fully capable of performing all major life
activities and is therefore not impaired within the meaning of section 504.1-'
Furthermore, even though a carrier of a contagious disease may suffer adverse
social and professional consequences, he cannot be regarded as handicapped
simply because he is ostracized by others. '3 Moreover, even in the case of an
actual AIDS victim, an employer may discharge the victim not because the
victim suffers from the disabling effects of AIDS, but because the employer
articulates a fear of the victim's ability to transmit the disease.1 6 The AIDS
victim, therefore, is only protected under the Act when the employer discharges
37
the employee because of the disabling effects of AIDS.
According to the DOJ, a victim of AIDS discrimination cannot even challenge the reasonableness of his employer's judgment about the risk of transmission.' 3 The DOJ stated that employers "are not prohibited by section 504
from making incorrect, and even irrational, decisions so long as their decisions
are not based on handicap." ' 39 While section 504 is intended to prevent employment discrimination, the DOJ opinion tends to condone such discrimination
when AIDS is involved.
If communicability, standing alone, is construed to be a handicap, the DOJ
would place the burden on the victim to prove that an employer's reasonable
accommodations would negate the victim's risk of transmitting the virus.' 4 The
DOJ suggested that courts weigh the likelihood that the illness can be transmitted and the extent of harm if this occurs.'M The extent of harm includes
not only the adverse effects of the illness on the person affected, but also the
fact that the infected person may spread the disease. 42 Under the DOJ rationale,

132. Id. at 25-29, 49.
133. Id. at 31. The DOJ would allow employers to make irrational decisions about an AIDS
victim's ability to transmit the virus. See Workplace Recommendations, supra note 10, at 682, and
supra note 11 and accompanying text for current medical evidence regarding AIDS transmission.
134. DOJ OPINION, supra note 24, at 24. The DOJ analogized a carrier to a "perfectly healthy
person carrying a test tube containing the infectious agent." Id.
135. Id. at 25.
136. Id. at 31-32.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 31.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 38 n.88.
141. Id. at 37.

142. Id. The DOJ discussed the inverse relationship between the extent of harm caused by
the contagious disease and the degree of risk of transmission that a normal person must assume.
The common cold is at one end of the spectrum because it is highly contagious yet relatively
temporary and minor. AIDS represents the opposite extreme because the risk of transmission may
be slight, but the extent of harm is high, since AIDS is "incurable, highly painful and ultimately
fatal." The DOJ suggested that humans naturally prefer "to err on the safe side" when confronted
with such a disease. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss4/4

14

Mitchell: Employment Discrimination and AIDS: Is AIDS a Handicap Under Sect

19861

86UPLOYMAENT DISCRIMINATION AND AIDS

the victim of AIDS-related employment discrimination is not otherwise qualified
unless he can prove that the risk of transmission can be calculated with a high
degree of medical certainty. 1 43 Additionally, the victim must prove that the risk
of transmission is low enough, without "substantial" modification in the program, to be safely disregarded. 44 The DOJ suggested that when uncertainty
about the risk of communicability exists, an employer's decision should be
4
respected.' 5
Responding to the DOJ opinion, the Public Health Service and the CDC
reiterated that current evidence establishes that the AIDS virus is not transmitted
by casual contact in schools or the workplace. 4" Also in response to the DOJ
opinion, the American Medical Association (AMA) filed an amicus brief in the
Arline case. 1 47 The AMA argued that a proper section 504 inquiry must be
based on sound medical judgment regarding the risk to third parties to determine whether an individual is otherwise qualified for employment. 14 Employers
should not, as the DOJ suggested, be allowed to discriminate against a handicapped individual based on an irrational fear of the risk of casual transmission
of the AIDS virus in the workplace.' 49
IV.

ANALYSIS OF COMPETING VIEWPOINTS

AIDS is a frightening disease, and the public is understandably concerned
over its epidemic proportions in light of recent statistics." The Department of
Justice, however, is fostering irrational fears about how AIDS is transmitted.''
The DOJ asserted that employers are justifiably afraid because of the uncertain
medical evidence regarding AIDS transmissibility. 5 2 This rationale contradicts
the government's own public health announcements concerning the disease which
33
reiterate that AIDS cannot be transmitted through casual contact.?
Critics assert that the DOJ opinion will deter people from seeking testing

143. Id. at 38.
144. Id. at 38-39. In a footnote, the DOJ stated that the structure of § 504 suggests that the
plaintiff must carry the burden of proof. Id. at 38 n.88.
145. Id. at 39 n.90.
146. Justice IWould Permit Bias by Employers Citing Fear of AIDS, 1 AIDS PoL'Y & LAw (BNA)
No. 12, at 1 (July 2, 1986) [hereinafter Bias Permitted]. Robert E. Windom, Assistant Secretary of
Health at the Department of Health and Human Services (the department which requested the
DOJ Opinion), stated on June 24, 1986 that "employees, employers, and others can be assured
that the AIDS virus is not transmitted by casual contact whether in the workplace or schools."
Id. at 2.
147. AIDS Opinion, supra note 122, at I.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Marcotte, AIDS Que-stions Grow, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 28. As of September,
the CDC reported 24,576 persons with AIDS. The CDC estimated that between 1 million and
1.5 million persons are carrying the virus. By the end of 1991, the CDC expects 270,000 persons
to have contracted the disease. Id.
151. See DOJ OpIoN, supra note 24, at 31.
152. Id. at 37-38.
153. See Bias Permitted, supra note 146, at 2; Workplace Recommendations, supra note 10, at 682
(no epidemiological evidence showing transmission other than through semen or blood).
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for fear of employment reprisals. If so, the opinion will negatively impact on
the Public Health Service's ability to contain the disease. 1 4 Opponents of the
DOJ position also worry that small businesses, lacking resources to educate
workers, may find themselves under increasing pressure from employees who
demand dismissal of AIDS victims.' These businesses could discriminate against
5 6
AIDS victims by simply declaring a concern for public health.
In a footnote, the DOJ examined the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Arline
and agreed that discrimination based on the respiratory impairment caused by
tuberculosis (or the history or perception of such impairment) was a cognizable
handicap under section 504.157 The DOJ noted, however, that the school board
discharged Arline not because of her tuberculosis "impairment," but because
of her ability to transmit the disease.158 The DOJ concluded that the court
erroneously held that discrimination on the basis of contagion falls within the
plain meaning of section 504.1-9
If the Supreme Court accepts the DOJ view that Arline's ability to transmit
tuberculosis is not a protected handicap, the Court will not reach the issue of
whether Arline was "otherwise qualified" for her job. 16 0 Employers could then
discharge employees with any contagious disease without regard to the actual
degree of risk of contagion. Courts would not inquire into the reasonableness
of such a discharge because the decision would lie outside the scope of section
504.161 Moreover, employers could use fear of contagion as a pretext for dis62
criminating against employees with other handicaps.
For example, an employer may discharge a paralyzed worker who contracts
hepatitis, and may articulate a fear of contagion as the basis for the termination.
In fact, the employer may have been looking for a reason to fire the worker
because the employer held a bias against people in wheelchairs. Unfortunately
for the worker, a court would not question the probability of the worker spreading hepatitis since the worker's discharge would fall outside the coverage of
section 504. The handicapped employee, discharged because of his handicap,

154. See Bias Permitted, supra note 146, at 2. The DOJ Opinion was criticized by various health
officials, management lawyers, the AMA, gay rights and AIDS support groups. Representative Ted
Weiss (D-NY), Chairman of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations and Human Resources, went so far as to call the opinion "a homophobic political
statement under the guise of reasoned advice." Id.
The Consortium for Citizens With Developmental Disabilities, representing more than fifty
disability advocacy groups, sent a letter to Attorney General Edwin Meese III, asking the Reagan
Administration to withdraw the DOJ opinion. The Consortium's letter stated that if the DOJ
reasoning was accepted, "a major loophole would exist [in the law] that would allow the very fear
an irrationality Section 504 was enacted to combat to flourish with no legal redress." Justice Urged
to Rescind Opinion, 1 AIDS POL' & L.%w (BNA) No. 15, at 5 (Aug. 13, 1986).
155. Wall St. J., June 27, 1986, at 29, col. 2.
156. Id.
157. DOJ OPINION, supra note 24, at 27 n.70.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

163.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

at 45 n.105.
at 36-37.
at 34-35.
id. at 34.
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would suffer discrimination based on the type of prejudice which Congress
enacted section 504 to guard against. 63 The DOJ opinion suggested that employers are unlikely to assert fear of AIDS transmissibility as a pretext for an
otherwise discriminatory discharge. 164 However uncertain the medical facts regarding AIDS transmission might be, many employers claiming fear of contagion, reasonable or not, may discriminate on that basis rather than handicap. 6,
If the Supreme Court affirms Arline and construes communicability alone to
be a handicap, a factual inquiry must follow. 66 If an employer knows that a
court may scrutinize his decision to fire a worker, he will more seriously consider
accommodating the employee. Conversely, an employer discharging a contagious
worker who is unprotected by section 504 may discriminate with impunity.
Judicial review of an employer's lecision would enhance the legislative goal of
the Act by preventing an employer from making decisions based on irrational
fears or prejudice.' 67 Eliminating employment discrimination at this stage would
allow handicapped workers to continue functioning as productive members of
society.' 6
A court's decision on the "reasonable accommodation" issue will likely
depend on the burden of proof allocation. 69 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the employer has the burden of persuasion to prove inability
to accommodate the worker.' 70 In Mantolete v. Bolger,171 the United States Postal
Service refused to hire an epileptic worker because she was not "otherwise
qualified" for the position. The postal service determined that the applicant
was not otherwise qualified to operate a letter-sorting machine because of her
susceptibility to epileptic seizures. 7 2 Furthermore, the postal service argued that
accommodation was not reasonable because it was too expensive and would not
73
result in a machine safe enough for the applicant.
In reversing the lower court, 74 the Ninth Circuit held that the postal service
had not met its burden by showing that employing the applicant would pose
a "reasonable probability of substantial harm.' 175 Moreover, the postal service

supra note 24, at 35.

164.
165.

DOJ
Id.

166.

Id. at 37.

167.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

168.

Quite clearly, society would benefit by allowing an AIDS victim, or one simply perceived

OPINION,

as having AIDS, to continue working. The employee would continue contributing to the tax base,
social security and overall productivity. If, on the other hand, the employee is not allowed to work
due to his employer's ungrounded fear of contagion, the employee will become a financial drain

on society. Society would be forced to subsidize the healthy, but out-of-work employee indefinitely.
169. See Note, supra note 80, at 186-87; see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662
F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981) (once employer proves inability to accommodate, burden of proof

shifts to plaintiff).
170.

note 24,
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985). But see DOJ

OPINION,

supra

at 38 n.88 (DOJ arguing that plaintiff should have burden).
767 F.2d at 1421.
Id. at 1420.
Id.
Id. at 1425.
Id. at 1422.
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could not meet this burden by offering its own subjective evaluation. 175 Instead,
the postal service was required to provide a detailed work history and medical
evidence from qualified experts to establish that the applicant's handicap precluded safe employment. 177 According to this court, an employer's good faith
or rational belief is not a sufficient defense to an act of discrimination. 178
The Ninth Circuit relied, in part, on the Fifth Circuit decision in Prewitt
v. United States Postal Service.' 9 In Prewitt, the court held that the plaintiff must
first show he is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job.18& Thereafter, the employer must prove an inability to reasonably accommodate the
plaintiff. 18' The court reasoned the employer is in a better position than the
employee to obtain advice concerning possible accommodations from private
82
and government sources.
The court in New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Care,' --'
applied a similar approach to the otherwise qualified issue. The court rejected
the New York City Board of Education's claim that mentally retarded students
carrying hepatitis B should be segregated from other students because of the
risk of contagion.' 8 4 At trial, the Board was unable to demonstrate that the
health hazard posed by -hepatitis B carrier children was "anything more than
a remote possibility."' 18 - The court observed there was no definite proof that
the disease was communicable by routes such as saliva. 8 6 Even if such proof
existed, classroom activities were not shown to pose any significant risk of
disease transmission from one child to another. 87
The DOJ disagreed with the Carey court's reasoning to the extent it required
the Board to produce definite proof regarding the means by which people could
transmit the virus.'8 The DOJ viewed this requirement as "improperly shift[ing]
the risk of uncertainty regarding communicability to the Board and to healthy
students."' 89 According to the DOJ, Congress intended the otherwise qualified
requirement to protect employers, other workers, and the public from health
and safety hazards posed by the employment of some handicapped workers.'
A general principle of discrimination law is that once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must present evidence

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id. at 1423.
Id.
662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 309.
Id. at 308.
Id.; see Note, supra note 80, at 187-88.
612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 650.
Id.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. DOJ OPINIo N, supra note 24, at 39 n.90.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 38 n.88.
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to rebut the inference of illegality.191 Under the DOJ reasoning, an employee
with a contagious disease would face a monumental burden in establishing his
prima facie case. The employee would have to assemble medical data and expert
testimony sufficient to prove that the disease could not be transmitted by any
method while on the job. If the employee could not meet this burden, the
employee would be required to recommend reasonable accommodations to guard
against risk of contagion. An employer, on the other hand, is better able to
marshal evidence concerning possible accommodations that will not unduly burden his business. 92 Federal case law and purposes underlying the Rehabilitation
Act counsel in favor of this approach, which would require the employer to
show that there were no reasonable accommodations for the handicapped employee. 9
The Supreme Court's decision in Arline will directly impact subsequent federal claims under section 504. '94 Additionally, it may influence AIDS-related
employment discrimination claims at the state level. Since the public's reaction
to AIDS and the incidence of AIDS varies by state, state statutes reflect differences in coverage for handicap employment discrimination. 95 One variation
is whether the statute includes a definition of handicap. Florida, for example,
does not include a statutory definition of handicap in its employment discrimination law.'96 If the statute does not define handicap, state courts generally
look to the federal interpretation.
The Florida Commission on Human Relations' 97 relied on the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of section 504 in Arline to determine whether AIDS is
a protected handicap under Florida's anti-discrimination statute. 9 ' In Shuttleworth
191. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (Tide VII); Wade
v. Missisippi Co-op Extension Serv., 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976) (Title VI).
192. See Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 308. For example, the "employer has greater knowledge of the
essentials of the job." Id. Also, the employer can rely on his own experience or that of other

employers. Id.
193. Sre supra note 31 and accompanying text.
194. The Supreme Court's construction of § 504 will add a judicial gloss on the definition of
handicap.
195. Georgia, for example, expressly excludes coverage for persons with communicable diseases.
GA. CoDE ANN. § 66-503(b)(2) (1985). A recent National Gay Rights Advocate survey, however,
found that 34 states consider AIDS discrimination a violation of state handicap law. See Marcotte,
supra note 150, at 28.
196. FLA. STAT. § 760.03 (1985). Sections 706.01-.10 are known as the Human Rights Act
of 1977. The Act's purposes are
[to] secure for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimination because of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status and thereby to protect
their interest in personal dignity, to make available to the state their full productive capacities, to secure the state against domestic strife and unrest, to preserve the public safety,
health, and general welfare, and to promote the interests, rights, and privileges of individuals within the state.
Id. 5 760.01(2). This section does not define handicap. See id. § 760.02.
197. The Human Rights Act of 1977 established the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Id. § 760.03. The Commission has authority, among other things, to hold hearings on, and act
upon complaints alleging discriminatory practice. Id. § 760.06(5).
198. Shuttleworth v. Broward County, No. 85-0624, slip. op. at 2 (Fla. Comm'n on Human
Relations Dec. 11, 1985).
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v. Broward Count,' 99 the Commission ruled that without proof of AIDS transmission by casual workplace contact, firing workers with AIDS is unlawful. In
Shuttleworth, the county fired a budget analyst, Todd Shuttleworth, after learning
he had AIDS. Even though Shuttleworth worked in a private office, county
officials thought the risk of Shuttleworth's transmitting AIDS to co-workers was
a sufficient reason to terminate his employment. 00
In ruling that AIDS qualifies as a handicap under Florida law, the Commission cited the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Arline as it related to communicable diseases.20 ' The Commission observed that the county failed to show
there was a substantial risk of future injury to other employees if Shuttleworth
remained at work. 20 2 The Commission looked at the plain meaning of the term
"handicap," and the medical evidence presented, and concluded that an individual with AIDS is covered by the Human Rights Act of 1977 because such
individual does not have the full and normal use of his sensory, mental or
20 3
physical faculties.
If the Supreme Court accepts the DOJ opinion and reverses the Eleventh
Circuit in Arline, the Commission's decision that AIDS is a handicap under
Florida law may be challenged. Since the Florida statute does not define handicap, 204 the Commission's reliance on the Arline interpretation may prove fatal
to victims of AIDS-related discrimination in Florida. Consequently, the Court's
decision may force AIDS victims to look elsewhere for protection, such as state
statutes and state courts.

V.

PROPOSED SOLUTrONS

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Arline will set a precedent
for future section 504 claims.203 The Court may affirm the Eleventh Circuit
and broadly hold ,that a person's ability to transmit any contagious disease is
a protected handicap under section 504.206 Individuals suffering AIDS-related
discrimination would be protected under the Act. However, the Court may
affirm the Eleventh Circuit but confine its holding to the facts before the Court,
expressly avoiding the AIDS issue. If the Coart follows the latter approach, or
reverses the lower court altogether, victims of AIDS-related discrimination should
look to Congress for protection.
The legislature could follow one of several alternatives for AIDS victim
protection. Congress could amend section 504 and include contagiousness as an
"impairment, "207 or enact specific legislation regarding discrimination against
AIDS victims. Employers would face problems, however, in reconciling Con-

199.

Id. at 6.

200.

Id. at 3-4.

201.

Id. at 2.

202. Id. at 6.
203. Id. at 2.
204.

205.
206.
207.

See
See
See
See

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

196.
194 and accompanying text.
118.
45 and accompanying text.
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gress' approach to AIDS victims with their own duty to provide a safe work
environment for other employees. Congress could help resolve this conflict by
208
codifying the Supreme Court's Davis test.
Congress has, in fact, imposed an explicit requirement that an employer
consider accommodations in determining a handicapped person's qualifications.
These requirements, however, pertain only to section 501 of the Act, which
20 9
provides protection for the handicapped in the executive branch. AIDS victims
would benefit by a similar provision in section 504. Section 504 should include
guidelines for determining what constitutes "reasonable accommodation." The
Act should require that an employer make reasonable accommodation unless
the accommodation would change the essential nature of the activity or impose
an undue hardship on the employer.210 Reasonable accommodation could include
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, separate physical facilities or medically suggested procedures.
Congress could provide employers further guidance by listing factors to consider in determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. Considerations might include the size of the business
and number of employees, the number and type of facilities and operating
capital, the type of business and composition of the workforce, and the nature
and cost of the accommodation. With specific suggestions and guidelines available, employers would be more likely to accommodate AIDS victims by considering reasonable solutions.
State legislatures should also address the AIDS issue by incorporating express
protection for AIDS-related conditions into state anti-discrimination statutes.
Moreover, state legislatures or municipalities should consider specific AIDS legislation and ordinances. Wisconsin, for example, banned the use of AIDS-related
12
211
Both Los Angelese
tests by employers, health care providers, and insurers.
and San Francisco 2 3 enacted city ordinances prohibiting AIDS-related discrimination in areas such as employment, housing, educational institutions, business
establishments and other public accommodations. As the AIDS epidemic increases, employers and AIDS victims will need greater guidance in employment
decisions. Federal and state legislatures can best supply some of the answers.
VI. CONCLUSION

Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to protect handicapped
individuals from employment discrimination. Recently, this statute has formed
the basis for employment discrimination claims by AIDS victims and persons
perceived as carrying the AIDS virus. The United States Supreme Court has
the opportunity to specifically include persons with communicable diseases within
the Rehabilitation Act's protection. By interpreting the term "handicapped in208.
209.

See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
29 U.S.C. § 791 (1986); see also 29 C.F.R. § 704(a)-(c) (1986).

210. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
211.

Wis. STAT. §§ 103.15, 146.025 (1985).
ANGELES, CA., CODE art. 5.8, § 45.82 (1985).
SAN FRAscisco, CA., CODE §§ 3803-3807 (1985).

212. Los
213.
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dividual" to encompass persons infected with tuberculosis as a communicable
disease, the Court would establish a precedent potentially applicable to victims
of AIDS-related discrimination. If the Court does not take this approach, Congress and state legislatures should act quickly to fill the gap.
Protecting persons with AIDS or other communicable diseases would further
the legislative purpose underlying section 504 by prohibiting employment decisions based on irrational fears, prejudice or stereotypes. It would not, as the
DOJ suggested, lead to increased risks of AIDS transmission because, under
section 504, emlloyers could still make reasonable accommodations to ensure
safety in the workplace. Courts and policy makers should utilize any opportunity
to ensure that AIDS victims can continue to function as productive members
of society for as long as possible.
VI.

EPILOGUE

On March 3, 1987, the Supreme Court released its opinion in Nassau County
School Board v. Arline, affirming the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 14 The
Supreme Court held that an individual with the contagious disease of tuberculosis may be a handicapped individual under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. 215 Justice Brennan, writing for a seven member majority, 216 stated that
Arline had a record of impairment that substantially limited "one or more of
her major life activities," because tuberculosis affected her respiratory system. 2 7
Additionally, the contagiousness of the disease did not remove Arline from
protection under section 504.218 Since the district court did not conduct an
individualized factual inquiry into whether Arline was "otherwise qualified" in
spite of her contagiousness, the Court remanded the case for additional findings
219
of fact.
The Court's holding should apply to individuals actually suffering from the
disabling effects of AIDS, who are discriminated against because of an employer's fear of AIDS transmission in the workplace. Like tuberculosis, AIDS
is a contagious disease which physically impairs its victims. Since the Court
refused to allow discriminatory treatment against Arline due to the contagious22
ness of tuberculosis, AIDS victims should likewise be protected. 1
The Court discussed the "otherwise qualified" issue and ruled that an individualized, factual inquiry was necessary to protect handicapped individuals
from discrimination based on an employer's unfounded fears. 2 At the same
time, the inquiry must balance legitimate concerns of health and safety risks

214. 55 U.S.L.W. 4275 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1987).

.215.

Id. at 4249.

216.

Id. at 4246. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia dissented. Id. at 4249.

217. Id. at 4247.
218. Id. at 4247-48.
219. Id. at 4249.
220.

See id. at 4248.

221.

Id. at 4249.
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to others. 22 A court must evaluate the medical findings and determine whether
2 23
an employer could reasonably accommodate the employee in the workplace.
The Supreme Court stated, however, that one who is likely to transmit an
infectious disease in the workplace "will not be otherwise qualified for his or
her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk.' 22'
Due to the reasonable accommodation requirement, an employer can no
longer summarily discharge an employee suffering from a contagious disease.
Instead, the employer must respond rationally and consider medical evidence
about the contagiousness of the disease. 22- In the case of someone infected with
AIDS, for example, this means an employer must consider current medical
evidence showing that AIDS cannot be transmitted by mere casual contact.
Additionally, an employer must consider whether reasonable accommodations
could be made for continued employment, in light of the medical evidence
presented. By including contagious diseases within the coverage of section 504,
the Court has subjected an employer's decision to judicial review. As a result,
employers are more likely to conform their employment decisions to medically
reasonable judgments, instead of unfounded and irrational hysteria.
In a footnote, the Court declined to reach the question of whether an AIDS
carrier would be physically impaired within the meaning of section 504, or
whether contagiousness, alone, would qualify as a section 504 handicap. 226 The
Court noted, however, that Congress was concerned about the effect of an
impairment on others as well as its effect on the individual. 227 Thus, even though
an individual is merely regarded as having an impairment although not actually
physically or mentally impaired, a negative reaction by others could substantially
limit the individual's major life activity of working. 228 Myths and fears about
disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment. 21 9 The Supreme Court, therefore, refused to exclude persons with
actual or perceived contagious diseases from the coverage of section 504.210
PATRICIA MITCHELL
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